We propose a framework for designing randomized stream ciphers with enhanced security. The key attribute of this framework is using of nonlinear bijective mappings or keyless hash functions for random coding. We investigate the computational security of the proposed ciphers against chosen-plaintext-chosen-initialization-vector attacks and show that it is based on the hardness of solving some systems of random nonlinear Boolean equations. We also provide guidelines for choosing components to design randomizers for specified ciphers.
Introduction
In [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] , a generic class of randomized stream ciphers based on joint employment of dedicated random (or homophonic) coding and error-correction coding by linear binary codes is proposed and studied. One of the goals of designing such ciphers is to increase the security (without substantial performance reducing) of stream ciphers currently used in wireless communication systems, particularly, in the GSM standard. Another reason is to construct symmetric encryption schemes, whose security can be reduced to the hardness of some known mathematical problem such as the problem of decoding a random linear code [6] .
Further investigation of the ciphers proposed in [3, 4] showed [7] that their computational security significantly depends on the properties of their components and can be considerably less than their designers claim. In particular, some of specified ciphers are vulnerable even to ciphertext-only attacks and the problem of choosing components for their design (according to both security and practicality requirements) is non-trivial and requires further research.
In this paper, we propose another framework for designing randomized stream ciphers with enhanced security. This framework is based on ideas from [8, 9] and consists in using of nonlinear bijective mappings or keyless hash functions for random coding. It is shown that the security of the proposed ciphers in the chosen-plaintext-chosen-initialization-vector (IV) attacking scenario is based on the hardness of solving some systems of random nonlinear Boolean equations. In addition, we provide guidelines for choosing components to design randomizers for specified ciphers.
Proposed Framework
For any natural n denote by n V the set of all 
where ⊕ denotes the bitwise XOR operation. The legitimate receiver, knowing
, can find the message ) ( ) , ( 1 − * is defined by the relation:
. After that he can recover i s by the formula Fig. 1 ). On the other hand, the adversary in order to find the key k will be forced to deal with a corrupted keystream
Let us remark that the objects , φ * , P should be chosen under the requirements for both the cryptographic security and the implementation efficiency of transformation (1) . Taking into account the last requirement, we can set, for example, ( We propose to use one of the two general approaches:
(1) use as φ a bijective mapping on the set l V (for l m 2 = ) "with good cryptographic properties" such as those used in modern block ciphers; (2) use as φ a keyless hash function (such as Keccak [10] ). Taking into account the fact that a secure hash function simulates a random mapping (in our case from l m V − to l V ) sufficiently well, the last variant looks more preferable with regard to providing adequate security of the randomized cipher.
Thus the key attribute of the proposed framework is using of the above mentioned nonlinear mappings for designing randomized stream ciphers. This is the main difference from the framework described in [1 -5] , where only binary linear transformations, particularly, error-correction coding of input messages by linear codes, are used. (Emphasize that the mentioned coding is not used in (1) at all).
Also note that, in comparison with randomized block ciphers [8, 9] , nonlinear mappings used in randomizers of the proposed stream ciphers have slightly different requirements related to the specific attacks precisely on stream ciphers. This determines the differences between design criteria for randomizers used in randomized block and stream ciphers, respectively. In particular, keyless hash functions can be used in randomized stream ciphers with nonlinear random coding that differs the proposed framework from the one described in [8, 9] .
Security Evaluation of the Proposed Ciphers Against Chosen-plaintext-chosen-IV Attacks

Basic Attack
Let's consider one of the most powerful attacks on randomized stream ciphers [7] , when the adversary has access to the encryption oracle with unknown (chosen uniformly at random from the set K ) key k 
It is also clear that the set of all solutions of system 
For any
is the intersection of independent random sets distributed as follows:
To find the solution 0
x of system (2) Let's denote (2) can be found with
It is sufficient to prove that the error probability, 
Thus inequality (6) and the statement are proved. Hence it becomes impractical, e.g., as
Corollary 1. Let condition (3) holds and
64 ≥ − l m .
Another Variants of the Attack in a Particular Case
Let's consider an important particular case, when in system (2) ) ,
Note that in this case parameter (5) coincides with the quantity
, (8) which measures the resistance of the mapping φ against differential cryptanalysis (see [11] , for example).
In this case, to solve system (2) we can apply another technique, which is sometimes more effective than Algorithm 1. This technique is related to linear cryptanalysis and correlation attacks on randomized stream ciphers with linear random coding [3 -5, 7] .
For any
Consider the following algorithm of recovering the solution 0
x of system (2) under condition (7). The proof of the following statement is almost the same as the proof of Statement 4 in [7] .
Statement 2. Under condition (7) the adversary can recover on step 2 of Algorithm 2 all values
, with probability at least (2) .
Note that the data complexity, i.e., the number of equations in system (10), necessary for recovering one arbitrary quantity (9) is sufficiently small (e.g., 32 2 − φ ≤ L ). In conclusion, consider another possible approach (based on ideas from algebraic cryptanalysis) for solving system (2) under condition (7) . Denote ) , (
Then (2) is equivalent to the system of equations:
which can be written as follows:
The following statement is oblivious. Statement 3. Under condition (7) the computational security of the considered cipher is upper bounded by the time complexity of solving the system of equations (11) for arbitrary (known) vectors
There a lot of families of Boolean mappings with small values of parameters (8) and (9) (see [11, 12] , for example). But not all of them guarantee high complexity of solving systems of the form (11) .
As an example, consider the mapping 2 2 ) (
, where l m 2 = , l is even, widely used in modern block ciphers. It is known that
, but each separate equation of system (11) has at most four solutions, which can be found in real time [13] . Thus, having a small (namely, ) number of equations in system (2), we can find in real time its (unique with probability at least
x by solving system (11).
At the same time, the problem of solving a system of the form (11) for arbitrary mapping
is computationally hard. Moreover, no efficient algorithms of solving such systems for any modern computationally secure hash functions are known so far. It seems very likely that the existence of such algorithms can be an undesirable property, which will allow us to distinct a hash function from the truly random mapping.
Conclusion
In contrast to before known approaches [1 -5, 8, 9] , the described framework gives more possibilities for designing computationally secure randomized stream ciphers. This is achieved by enlarging the class of transformations used in the construction of a randomizer. As the operation * in (1) the addition modulo m 2 or the bitwise Boolean addition of binary vectors can be used, besides in the last case the matrix P can be chosen as the identity matrix of order m .
Under condition (7) the computational security of the proposed randomized stream ciphers in the chosen-plaintext-chosen-IV attacking scenario is determined by the following properties of the mapping (b) small value of (9) to resist the linear-type attack (Algorithm 2); (c) high time complexity of solving systems of equations (11) .
In order to increase the practicality of the encryption scheme it is also desirable to choose the quantity l sufficiently large in comparison with m . For example, we can put 128 = = − l l m that provides encryption rate 2 1 = m l independently from the choice of φ .
In order to resist the considered above (as well as other possible) attacks it is desirable that mapping φ should have properties similar to those of random equiprobable mapping from l m V − to l V . From this point of view, it is natural to choose as φ one of modern keyless hash functions. We conjecture that any general attack on the randomized stream cipher can by efficiently transformed in an appropriate attack on the underlined hash function, but currently we don't have an accurate proof of this statement.
